In the EU harmonisation of healthcare has long been elusive. Article 168 paragraph 7 TFEU even forms a sector-specific subsidiarity clause. Meanwhile the ECJ handed down a series of judgments concerning patients' rights to reimbursement for healthcare consumed in other Member States. An initial attempt to codify this case law in the Services Directive failed in 2004. In March 2011 however, following a two-and-a-half year legislative process the EU patient's rights Directive was adopted. It codifies the old patients' rights, creates new rights to accountability and transparency, and promotes cooperation among national healthcare systems. As such it can be seen as a watershed in EU involvement in the healthcare sector.
security coverage as such is determined by the Member State of affiliation alone and therefore not at issue. Nor is the right of individual patients to seek treatment abroad and pay for it themselves at stake: they are free to do so. Instead the focus of both the Article 56 TFEU regime and that of Regulation 1408/71 is on the conditions for the reimbursement of treatment abroad, when a patient is in principle entitled to the treatment involved in his Member State of affiliation.
-When Article 56 TFEU is relied on reimbursement is at the level of domestic treatment in the Member State of affiliation, based on Regulation 1408/71 reimbursement is at the level of the Member State of treatment.
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-More complicated is the question whether prior authorisation may be required.
Based on Regulation 1408/71 prior authorization of treatment abroad is always required as a condition for reimbursement. Based on Article 56 TFEU, prior authorization (which is in principle a barrier to the freedom to provide services) may be required for hospital services. This is considered justified to safeguard the financial balance of the national social security system of the Member States and planning in the hospital sector.
-So far the Court has never required evidence before allowing this justification.
Over time it has come to accept that prior authorization may be justified provided that material and procedural due process guarantees are respected concerning the objective and proportionate nature of the authorization process, notably fleshing out the concept of "undue delay" by requiring due regard to the individual circumstances of each patient. These requirements are similar if not identical for the Article 56 TFEU setting and that of Regulation 1408/71.
In this manner the Court has balanced the public interest justifications invoked by the Member States with the rights of individual patients based on free movement. Against this background, the proposed patients' rights Directive will be discussed. 15 Cf. T.K. Hervey, "The current legal framework on the right to seek healthcare abroad in the European Union", (2007) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 261. 16 Where the latter is lower than the former, the difference may be claimed based on Article 56 TFEU. Cf. 
The legislative context

Renewing the social agenda
The Proposal for a Directive "on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare" as presented in July 2008 formed part of a raft of some twenty documents and proposals jointly billed as a renewed social agenda for 21 st century Europe. 17 In stark contrast to the earlier attempt to embed patient mobility in the undiluted economic logic of the Services Directive, the connecting theme behind the July 2008 package was to complement the Lisbon growth strategy of the EU from a social perspective.
Another difference between the proposed patients' rights Directive and the failed earlier attempt to include a single article on healthcare in the Services Directive is that the Proposal is a full-fledged dedicated legal instrument purporting to provide a complete and coherent legal regime for all the issues involved.
Impact assessment: quantifying the case for codification
The Proposal was published with an Impact Assessment which the Commission used to motivate its choice between different policy options. 18 The Impact Assessment stated that over 12 months 4% of the EU population had received medical treatment in another Member State, that 70% of the EU population believes such treatment would be reimbursed and that just over half the EU population was open to travelling to another EU Member State to receive treatment.
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The Impact Assessment further states that cross-border healthcare accounts for 1% of public healthcare expenditure. 20 Hence, the overall impact of patient mobility in the EU is small, although its local impact may be much greater e.g. in border regions, smaller 17 Cf. Member States, in tourist areas, and in systems or for treatments involving high copayments (out of pocket expenses for patients).
Overall, the Impact Assessment identifies "a rising trend for cross-border healthcare and significant potential demand from citizens to explore cross-border healthcare where it is quicker, better, cheaper or more convenient for them". 21 The Impact Assessment shows that a dedicated Directive covering both hospital and non-hospital care provides net benefits in relation to the costs involved, more specifically a positive balance of € 179,6 million, with 780,000 extra patients receiving treatment for the EU as a whole.
These gains appear rather small as a basis for making the case for EU action. There is a contradiction at play here. The Commission struggled with the need to argue on the one hand, that something meaningful is at hand requiring EU legislation and, on the other hand, that the impact of this legislation on national social security regimes will be small enough that prior authorisation requirements are unlikely to be justified.
The Commission has not been successful in doing the latter: one of the main differences between the Proposal and the Directive as adopted is that the latter leaves considerable room for appeals to overriding reasons of general interest based on an exception for planning that the Court had earlier recognised in this context. This planning exception can even be invoked by the Member State of treatment to justify safeguard measures that had not been foreseen in the Proposal. It is still an open question to what extent quantification will be required in terms of demonstrating the necessity and proportionality requirements with respect to the planning exception. So far however the Court has not required quantification.
The dynamics of "old" and "new" patient's rights
"Patients' rights", the key to the title chosen by the Commission for the Proposal, refers to a concept that is much broader in scope than the reimbursement of cross-border medical treatment (the "old" patients' rights that the Court had developed in its case law). 22 This broader concept is primarily linked to the common principles that are framed as obligations of the Member State of treatment. These include quality and safety standards, access to the information necessary for (or "relevant to") informed choice (i.e. 21 Ibid., p. 11.
transparency), the means to complain and obtain remedies (i.e. accountability), compensation for harm and privacy rights. These can in effect easily be rephrased as a set of "new" and potentially highly significant rights to cover all patients, not merely mobile ones. In this way "old" patients' rights may be generating "new" ones: both categories will be examined further below.
Legal basis and scope
Legal basis
In line with the Proposal, the Directive as it was ultimately adopted is based on the Finally article 168 TFEU is also relevant for the cooperation efforts of the Member States with relation to healthcare and/or public health, some of which are covered by the Directive (such as E-health and the other cooperation topics that will be addressed below).
Scope
The scope of the Directive appears to cover all types of curative care without distinction in relation to their funding regime, hence it is not limited to healthcare in the sense of article 168 paragraph 7 TFEU, but also healthcare that is provided privately outside the public health setting. 27 The Proposal had made this explicit in its definition of healthcare.
Article 3(a) of the Directive now defines healthcare as follows:
""Healthcare" means health services provided by health professionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore their state of health, including the prescription, dispensation and provision of medicinal products and medical devices." 25 Cf. Preamble of the Directive, recitals 3a and 5a, as well as article 7 paragraph 3 of the Directive which reads: "It is for the Member State of affiliation to determine, whether at a local, regional or national level, the healthcare for which an insured person is entitled to the assumption of costs and the level of assumption of those costs, regardless of where the healthcare is provided." 26 Under the terms of the Directive its relationship with the Regulation will henceforth be determined by a clear priority rule and an exception to this rule, while responsibility for both of which is clearly assigned as well. This is because article 8 paragraph 3 of the resources assigned to them. The measures referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national provisions on the donation or medical use of organs and blood." 28 Determining undue delay requires "to have regard to all the circumstances of each specific case and to take due account not only of the patient's medical condition at the time when authorisation is sought and, where appropriate, of the degree of pain or the nature of the patient's disability which might, for example, make it impossible or extremely difficult for him to carry out a professional activity, but also of his medical history". Case C-56/01, Case the Regulation unless the patient himself requests otherwise -i.e. requests to obtain a prior authorisation in accordance with the Directive instead. This appears to be a relatively straightforward system that leaves little room for misunderstandings and a distinct improvement over the Proposal which left too many responsibilities on this count with the patient -especially determining whether "undue delay" might be involved. This means that the earlier risk that the meaning of "undue delay" would come to diverge between the two legal instruments has also been addressed.
Undue delay: a time-limit which is medically justifiable
The right to treatment without undue delay had not been properly addressed by the Proposal because it only came up in relation to the procedure for the treatment of prior authorisation requests but not as a material norm for assessing these requests themselves.
On this issue therefore the Directive also provides a clear improvement over the proposal.
The right to treatment without undue delay surfaces twice in the Directive:
x Article 8 paragraph 5 concerning healthcare that can be subject to a prior authorisation requirement provides that such authorisation may not be refused if the healthcare in question is among the benefits to which the insured person is entitled in the Member State of affiliation and when this healthcare cannot be provided on its territory within a time-limit which is medically justifiable, based on an objective medical assessment of the patient's medical condition, the history and probable course of his illness, the degree of pain he is in and/or the nature of his disability at the time when the request for authorisation was made or renewed.
This means the central role for this important material norm developed in the case law is maintained by the Directive.
x Article 9 paragraph 3 of the Directive provides that requests for prior authorisation must be treated within a reasonable time limits (as did the Proposal, although it did no more) made public in advance, and that when considering a request for cross-border healthcare Member States shall take into account the specific medical condition and urgency and individual circumstances. In addition to this material norm article 9 paragraph 4 sets out the procedural requirements developed in the case law such as the right to a reasoned decision on a case by case basis and subject to judicial review.
In this manner undue delay was given an appropriate role, preventing divergence on this criterion with the case law as well as in relation to Regulation 883/2004. As a result the consistency between the three systems was increased, while reducing the room to invoke the freedom to provide (or enjoy) services directly without reference to the Directive.
The right to reimbursement
The basis for reimbursement (at the level prevailing in the Member State of treatment for
Regulation 1408/71 and at that of the Member State of affiliation for Article 56 TFEU, or now the proposed patients' rights Directive) will continue to differ under the two regimes.
Whereas under Regulation 1408/71 the general rule is that patients do not have to meet the costs of treatment directly, under the regime of the proposed patients' rights Directive payment by the patient subject to subsequent reimbursement is the rule.
Would an amendment of the social security rules have sufficed?
These observations on the similarities and the differences between the two systems raise the question whether a separate Directive is in fact necessary and whether amending patients' rights may yet help shake up national healthcare markets.
The framework for cross-border healthcare: the "old" patients' rights
We now move on to the codification of the Court's patient mobility case law.
Reimbursement of actual costs
The core of the codification of the obligations for the Member State of affiliation is formed by article 7 on general principles for reimbursement of costs; article 8 regarding prior authorisation requirements and article 9 on the procedures concerned. States.
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Member States of affiliation will also be required to have a transparent mechanism for the calculation of such costs, which must be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria that are known in advance. 32 This seemingly self-evident requirement is likely to have far-reaching consequences especially for benefits in kind and NHS systems that in most cases are likely to lack useful pre-existing cost information on which reimbursement can be based. Given the difficulties associated with the introduction of sound cost accounting principles where such practices were not already in place, a common EU understanding of the relevant costing principles may be required before long.
Supplementary conditions
Article 7 paragraph 7 of the Directive also provides for the possibility for the Member
State of affiliation to impose additional conditions at national, regional or local level upon insured persons who are requesting reimbursement of costs for cross-border healthcare, such as selection criteria and conditions of an administrative or regulatory nature, as it would impose if this healthcare were provided in its territory. However these conditions cannot be discriminatory or go beyond what can be justified based on the planning exception with respect to ensuring access to healthcare and/or controlling healthcare expenditure which is repeated at this point of the Directive (and which will be more fully addressed below).
Non-hospital care: full liberalisation
What the Proposal had made explicit is regulated by omission in the Directive: patients are entitled to seek non-hospital care which is covered by their national social security regime in other Member States without prior authorization, and are entitled to reimbursement at the level as if the care had been provided in the Member State of affiliation. It is assumed therefore that this will by definition not undermine the financial equilibrium of social security systems.
Although the categories intramural and extramural care do not appear in the Directivethe distinction is now between healthcare that may or may not be subjected to a prior authorisation requirement -the distinction between these two types of care remains sensitive. Apart from the question whether an overnight stay is involved which is easily answered (although it may be answered differently between different jurisdictions or different healthcare providers within them) healthcare that can be subject to prior authorisation requirements also concerns healthcare involving the use of highly specialised and cost-intensive infrastructure or medical equipment. 33 The Proposal intended to regulate this based on a list to be set up and regularly updated by the Commission. In the Directive the Member States themselves determine which types of care are involved and notify these to the Commission. 33 Case C-512/08, Commission v France (extramural treatment), judgment of 5 October 2010 (nyr).
Hospital care and specialised care: the end of prior authorisation regimes?
For the most contested type of cross-border care, that which requires at least one overnight stay as well as specialised and cost-intensive care the Directive allows the Member State of affiliation to introduce a prior authorisation system. 34 Article 8 paragraph 2 reads as follows:
"Healthcare that may be subject to prior authorisation shall be limited to healthcare which:
(a) is made subject to planning requirements relating to the object of ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality treatment in the Member State concerned or to the wish to control costs and avoid, so far as possible, any waste of financial, technical and human resources and: Moreover, a prior authorization system must be limited to what is necessary and proportionate, and may not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination.
The Proposal had set up something very different: the Member States would have had to provide actual evidence that the outflow of patients due to cross-border hospital care 34 Hospital services and specialized care concern healthcare that requires an overnight stay (for one or more nights) or that is included on a limited list that is established according to comitology procedures and seriously undermines their social security system or planning in the hospital sector.
However, the Commission clearly believed these data did not exist and even proposed that the Directive should state so explicitly.
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The Directive itself requires only that prior authorisation systems are not just based on planning requirements related to access and/or costs (the financial balance of the social security system is no longer cited as a separate overriding reason of general interest but is also subsumed by the planning exception) but also meet the requirement of necessity and proportionality. It seems that this is a much lighter burden of proof which also approximates the approach that the Court itself has followed so far more closely. A secondary but not unimportant aspect is that in this manner evidence of the underlying cost structure is also less likely to be required. The chance that Member States will prefer to forfeit the opportunity of introducing a prior authorisation system in order to avoid having to justify their costs is likewise reduced: hence there is more room to introduce or maintain prior authorisation systems under the Directive than there was under the proposal.
Apart from article 8 paragraph 2 sub (a) about prior authorisation requirements for "intramural care" article 7 paragraph 7 on conditions, criteria of eligibility and regulatory and administrative formalities (such as the requirement to consult a general practitioner in order to obtain a referral for specialised care) article 7 paragraph 9 opens the possibility to subject the rules on reimbursement themselves to limitations based on the planning exception. In all three cases the planning exception is invoked, i.e. planning requirements relating to the object of ensuring sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality treatment in the Member State concerned or to the wish to control costs and avoid, so far as possible, any waste of financial, technical and human resources.
involves the use of highly specialized and costly medical infrastructure or equipment, or involves treatments that present a particular risk to the patient or the population at large. 35 Thus recital 31 of the Preamble to the Proposal read: "The evidence available indicates that the application of free movement principles regarding use of healthcare in another Member State within the limits of the cover guaranteed by the statutory sickness insurance scheme of the Member State of affiliation will not undermine the health systems of the Member States or financial sustainability of their social security systems." Likewise in its Explanatory Memorandum (supra note 18, p. 16) the Commission clearly states that based on its Impact Assessment, "there is no evidence to suggest that such care [hospital care] will undermine the financial sustainability of health and social security systems overall or the organization, planning and delivery of health services." Ibid., at p 14: "The evidence available as set out in the impact assessment indicates that the application of free movement principles regarding use of healthcare in another Member State within the limits of the cover or the sickness insurance scheme of the Member State of affiliation will not undermine the health systems of the Member States or financial sustainability of their social security systems". I.e. not undermine at all, let alone seriously. now also be applied more widely.
Reasons to refuse prior authorisation
Before discussing the new patients' rights as well as cooperation I will briefly cover another innovation in the Directive: the reasons for refusal.
Paragraph 6 of Article 8 of the Directive now encapsulates the possible grounds for a refusal of a request for prior authorisation. The availability or otherwise without "undue delay" of alternative treatment options within the Member State of affiliation is the ground that has so far played a prominent role in the case law. In addition the new provision lists an unacceptable patient (health) risk; a risk that the general public will be exposed with reasonable certainty to a substantial safety hazard; and healthcare to be provided by a healthcare provider that raises serious and specific concerns relating to the respect of standards and guidelines on quality of care and patient safety. This limitation of the grounds for refusal is appropriate given the broadened scope for requiring prior authorisation respectively throwing up barriers to cross-border healthcare based on planning exceptions.
Common principles for healthcare: the "new" patients' rights
is significant: the Proposal had required "all relevant information". Should the information concerned facilitate making choices between treatments in different Member
States or just between treatment options? At least the latter appears probable. The references to information concerning "outcomes of the healthcare provided" have been purged from the Directive. The toughest category however -that of quality -has been retained. This limited obligation to provide information may yet provide the thin end of the wedge towards transparency-based reform.
Universal applicability for the new patients' rights?
In the proposal the scope of this important provision was not clearly defined:
-The Council Conclusions on which the text is based are clearly of general application.
-The heading ("Member State of treatment") suggested norms that apply for patients from other Member States.
-The wording (referring to healthcare in general, and not to cross-border healthcare) of the provision itself implied a general application.
This has now been changed: the responsibilities concerned are clearly marked as regarding cross-border healthcare. This does not change the general applicability of the underlying Council Conclusions. Moreover it is difficult to see how such fundamental norms of accountability and transparency could possibly be implemented solely for the benefit of patients from other Member States. Hence it is assumed here that they are universal rights that will come to apply to all patients, not just those moving across borders. This would involve a major step in terms of accountability to patients, and by healthcare providers.
Safeguards measures for Member States of treatment
Although the Proposal enabled a derogation from free movement to the Member State of affiliation in the shape of prior authorisation requirements it foresaw none for the Member State of treatment. In this regard the Directive has introduced an important change:
according to article 4 third paragraph of the Directive the same planning exception (concerning access to healthcare and/or cost control) that can be invoked by the Member
State of affiliation will become available to the Member State of treatment as well. The measures introduced in this respect must be made public in advance. This is an exception to the principle of non-discrimination with regard to nationality that applies to patients from other Member States more generally, including with respect to the prices charged for the healthcare provided.
This is significant as in the absence of tariff rebalancing it may clearly happen that charges for treatment of patients from other Member States are out of line with actual costs but attractive to the healthcare provider in question (e.g. to "fill empty beds"). In such cases payment is likely to cover only marginal costs rather than a share of fixed costs -putting pressure on public funding. Meanwhile competition between healthcare providers to attract mobile patients is likely to trigger new dynamics feeding through into the national market. On the one hand such developments could well contribute to undermining the financial sustainability and coherence of the existing national social security systems -while on the other hand contributing to pressure toward much needed rationalization and rebalancing. Hence the impetus toward change as a result of the rights Directive is likely to involve Member States in their role as Member States of treatment, not just as Member States of affiliation.
Cooperation
The Directive envelopes five types of cooperation that were so far the subject of the intergovernmental Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 39 This concerns:
x Mutual assistance and cooperation: this regards all kinds of (including bilateral) cooperation including the information exchange between the national contact points that are to be established according to article 4 of the Directive.
x Recognition of prescriptions issued in another Member State: if a medicinal product is authorised to be marketed on their territory prescriptions issued for such a product in another Member State must be recognised and dispensed (this provision enables delegated rule making by the Commission).
x European reference networks: these are voluntary networks that aim to combat in particular rare diseases requiring highly specialised healthcare, and promote e.g. the development of new diagnoses and treatments (this provision enables delegated rule making by the Commission as well).
x E-Health: this concerns electronic developments in healthcare and the work that is being done on developing the interoperability between systems, the necessary minimum data set, with a view toward building a high level of trust and security. 
Further analysis
The development of the law on patient mobility appears to fit the mould of the standard interaction between positive and negative integration: first national measures obstructing the freedom to provide services (in this case) are struck down by the Court, and then the need arises for re-regulation to fill the gap left, providing sufficient consensus for a more liberal Community regime to emerge. This can be illustrated by a more detailed discussion of the following two topics: justifying prior authorisation requirements; and the scope for change based on the "new" patient's rights.
Prior authorisation requirements: liberalisation
As we have seen the scope for invoking the planning exception has been increased in the 3. the extension of these rights to patients treated at home by the Directive 4. the leveraging of these rights (especially in terms of transparency and accountability) to begin transforming national healthcare systems.
So far thus hypothetical dynamic is at step 2.
By choosing the legislative route on patient mobility the Commission is took the calculated risk that in the course of the legislative process the relatively clear-cut and farreaching case law of the Court based on Article 56 TFEU itself would be diluted. This may now have paid off because the Directive incorporates a number of elements designed to set in motion further changes in healthcare systems at national level -to a significant degree precisely based on "patients' rights", which will in the longer term promote both greater efficiency and accountability.
At the same time the fact that the focus both of the recent case law and of the proposed Directive has been centred on the patient fits well with in a consumer (and/or citizen) oriented approach to European integration and is consistent with the social policy agenda that is being developed as a response to public scepticism about the benefits of the EUjust as it would be in line with a demand based economic view. It is also consistent with most perspectives that accept the potential of a positive role for the EU.
Conclusion
The Directive sets out a framework for cross-border healthcare in the EU. In doing so it follows the logic of positive integration following negative integration, and being combined with a formalisation of OMC based cooperation. Old rights to reimbursement of costs are supplemented by new rights to transparency and accountability. Benefits are not harmonised but the conditions for access to cross-border healthcare to a significant extent are.
The main technical content of the Directive can be divided into three parts: Third, and finally, other due process guarantees are imposed as well, such as the right to a decision on a case by case basis that is subject to judicial review in Article 9(3), and the (entirely new) limited list of grounds for refusal in article 8(5a) that was already mentioned. This completes the material and procedural norms that had already been developed in the case law.
Based on these three elements the Directive forms a coherent system that for this reason alone already forms an improvement on the Proposal concerning the aspects just discussed. However apart from leaving less room for uncertainty it also leaves less room for secondary effects such as exposing the way in which the costs of treatment are accounted for. In sum, the EU's approach followed the familiar sequence whereby striking down barriers to the market freedoms breeds the need for elaborating rights and obligations in legislation that strikes a new balance between private freedoms and legitimate public interests. For healthcare this is a watershed given the constitutional barriers that had been erected in the Treaty against harmonisation in this field. NZa TILEC
